This paper is a tribute to an unsung accountant, economist and engineer, who had a clear understanding of modern concepts in accounting and finance, such as discounted cash flows, risk-adjusted discount rates and Net Present Value (NPV), which are usually considered to be twentieth century developments. He applied these in practice from 1850 but, until now, he has not been publicly acknowledged as a pioneer of modern financial planning. The paper also raises the question why these methods had to be reintroduced a century later.
Introduction
Ideas, which are generally regarded as recent developments, often have a long history.
The "Net Present Value" rule of accepting investments that have positive net present values, attributed to Irving Fisher (Brealey and Myers (2000) , p.19 and p.29), was in regular use in the nineteenth century. Complex transfer pricing issues in large vertically integrated iron companies (Boyns et al. (1999) ) were discussed within companies before 1874 (their early starting date for Pearson and Knowles). This paper provides evidence for both these statements.
Nineteenth century published financial statements are regarded as misleading: Marriner (1980) warned business historians "to exercise the utmost caution in drawing conclusions from them" and the most cited paper on nineteenth century "accounting errors" is that of Brief (1965) defin ing these in company accounts as the failure to systematically distinguish between capital and revenue expenditure and the failure to periodically allocate the cost of fixed assets to expense.
(1965, p.14) Arnold (1995) distinguishes between accounts of the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth:
Marriner's criticisms are, in general, entirely appropriate as a commentary on the accounting practices of the first half of the twentieth, but the evidence … suggests that they are far less applicable to those of the later years of the nineteenth. Although accounting practices were highly inconsistent, levels of disclosure in published statements were far better than they were to become … in the second quarter of the twentieth century. … Depreciation charges … still appeared to function more as a (relatively overt) method of conservative financing than as an important and secret form of misrepresentation. (p.49) Evidence from railway accounts and law cases on both dividends and tax have been extensively studied and discussed to show that Brief's view underestimates the sophistication of the British nineteenth century business men who produced and read these accounts (Jones and Aiken (1994) , Lamb (1997) , Bryer (1993 ), Reid (1986 , Napier (1990) and many others). On the subject of coal and iron companies in particular, many recent papers 1 have modified these criticisms for specific nineteenth century companies, distinguishing between the directors' understanding of the capital/revenue issue and the limited disclosures in the published accounts.
In the absence of published accounting books and journals before about 1880, (see for example Pixley (1881) , Mattheson (1893)) surviving individual company ledgers and minutes have to be examined to discover the distinction made between revenue and capital expenditure in calculating distributable profits, how collieries, subsidiary companies and plant were valued and how transfer pricing decisions were reached.
This was done in all the "coal and iron" papers cited above, and in legal cases the court reports of each case must be analysed to the same end. This case-history approach is limited to specific companies with good surviving archives and does not provide collective evidence for the period before 1880.
There is, however, in the Northumberland Record Office, a substantial body of papers (NRO 725 Armstrong B and C) proving that all the issues mentioned above • the use of discounted cash flows for decision-making;
• issues of transfer pricing;
• the accounting distinction between capital and revenue expenditure were clearly understood from 1850 by one engineer, (and his sons and his many clients) who has never had proper recognition for his achievement as an early management consultant:
William Armstrong (1811 -1896).
He shared the name, home-town (Newcastle upon Tyne) and period of William G.
Armstrong This paper is primarily concerned with his insight as a management consultantat a time before this was a recognised occupation. He routinely employed modern valuation techniques such as discounted cash flows at risk adjusted discount rates almost a century before these became standard practice for British Accountants and some 30 years before the first book was published on the use of annuity factors in mining valuation (Hoskold (1877), quoted in Parker (1968) ). There is historic evidence of the earlier use of annuity tables in the seventeenth and eighteenth century for the valuation of land leases and forestry (Scorgie (1996) ) but this paper confirms Parker's view that in the coal and iron industry "the extension of discounting to investment in fixed assets … was based on the work of engineers and economists" (Parker (1968) , p.58).
After a section giving the sources, the main body of the paper relates to management and financial t echniques which Armstrong understood and employed.
These will be discussed in this order:
depreciation of fixed assets; in Section 3 transfer prices; in Section 4
Armstrong and Sons, the well-known firm of Mining Engineers" (for the valuation of the mines in the Prospectus for Horden Collieries Debenture Stock, July 1905 NRO 725/C54/4/126).
the valuation of mining freeholds and leaseholds, including subsections on leases and stamp duty; in Section 5 discounting techniques employed in valuations, as another subsection of Section 5.
A brief summary and an Appendix listing his most regular clients close the paper.
Sources
The Annual accounts for all three companies from 1881 are stored by year in the Stock Exchange archive in the London Guildhall Library (Coal and Iron).
Depreciation of fixed assets
The evidence from Armstrong's report books indicates that he had thought very hard about the problem of depreciating fixed assets and understood that the theory and the practice were constrained by the time and skill required to account for depreciation properly:
… a Pony may be replaced by a Horse and the difference in outlay may in the microscopic mind of minute Men, fall strictly under a capital charge to be replaced by its decimal annuity … and … the
The solution was an inevitable compromise: They were thinking of employing depreciation in the profit and loss account to reduce the profit available for distribution as dividends and to preserve the capital of a company with wasting mineral assets. The more usual use of such a provision was to provide internally generated funds for the replacement of fixed assets when exhausted but in this case the Directors wished to provide a lump sum to repay investors' capital if and when the lease expired or the minerals ran out, whichever came first. The Directors received a Report from Armstrong on October 7 1867: Gentlemen In treating the year's expenditure of a large concern like yours it is difficult to hit off any principle in dividing the expenditure between Capital and Current Account … .
The first object should be that outlay which in strictness is defined as capital outlay -that isoutlay which during its investment realises no income, should be suspended and so distributed over the future as a charge against costs that in the end the capital may be redeemed.
If the exact duration of any capital outlay of any year could be clearly predicted, then nothing would be easier than to estimate the annuity which debitted (sic) each year against future costs would recover the outlay.
(NRO B6 pp. 306 -13) The next few paragraphs considered and compared the annuity calculation over the estimated lifetime for the "simple" pit (of "once and for all" expenditure on sinkings which would ultimately be worthless when the coal was exhausted and plant which might have some scrap value at the end of the pit's life), with three other cases:
• pits with obsolete and replaced assets,
• pits which have been extended later in their life,
• pits with worn out and renewed plant and commented that all these cases would give rise to substantial administrative costs: the Bookkeeping will be clogged with endless yearly annuities and from the miscarriage of the calculation from unforeseen causes ...(and) … in practice th ere must be some limit to the principle for it would breed endless confusion.
For simplicity and with the instinctive conservatism of a born accountant, he suggested to Bolckow Vaughan that in practice all future capital expenditure of less than £2,000
should be charged to revenue and any greater sums written off over 5 years at most although this would be unpopular with the Managers:
They argue and in the abstract may argue correctly, that all outlay other than what is necessary to meet current work shou ld be treated as Capital and be distributed over years -But on the other hand, shareholders are jealous of Capital Accounts and distrust the mathematics which promise them the resuscitation of their money.
(ibid.)
It is important to note that £2,000 was a substantial sum in 1863, worth at least 50 times its present value (Fischer (1996) , p. 4).
Armstrong understood what the Directors of Bolckow Vaughan required of him: to "preserve your property so that at all times you shall have your Capital in hand and on the dissolution of the Company available to distribute amongst the shareholders". He therefore recommended that the amounts charged for depreciation be invested to accumulate at 4% per annum "otherwise the capital will not be recovered". British
Government Three-Percent Consols yielded 4% at that time (Fischer (1996) , p.163) so he was considering the safest possible long-term investment for the depreciation fund.
Bolckow Vaughan never adopted this part of his advice, possibly because the business needed internally generated funds for development and expansion. The Directors, in turn, stated that they "will have much pleasure in complying with the recommendations". The second annual report reaffirmed this compliance, but after 1868 depreciation was not disclosed in the annual accounts. A letter from William Armstrong dated 25 January 1875 (which was copied into Bolckow Vaughan's Directors' Minutes) reviewed the advice given in 1866 and the company's development since that date. The mining leases of the company and hence the life of the mining assets were much longer than at incorporation, so the depreciation provision could be reduced:
It is obvious that these extensions must affect the magnitude of the annuity to be yearly carried to the recouping fund and in a calculation I have recently made … I find that the fund already created is amply sufficient in itself to cover the annuities for the year 1875 with a small margin to the good ... I shall revise and resettle the annuities ... . It is clear from the figures discussed in the Directors' Minutes for 1874 that depreciation The reply is dated a prompt 14 June. Armstrong was aware that the Consett management had
… not added to the capital purchase money but placed the subsequent outlay, part of which has in strictness been capital outlay, on the Iron Works and Collieries to the debit of revenue. (NRO B7 p.99)
Consett's depreciation policy was to hold the value of the fixed assets constant at their 1864 amount in spite of substantial later capital investment. However, Armstrong was very concerned by the fact that Consett might be too dependent on short term leasehold coal fields for the raw materials employed in the trade and that the value of the leases was not being depreciated: He expressed his opinion that keeping the book value of the company constant when the fixed assets were subject to rapid erosion in value as the leases run out "is obviously unfair towards those who buy (shares) during the life of the Company and most unfair towards those who buy in later years" -(presumably because later investors would be misled by the company's policy of keeping the book value of the fixed assets constant as the leases expired). His practical depreciation policy recommendations for Consett were the same as those listed above for Bolckow Vaughan but he suggested that, in this case, the depreciation fund be first used to strengthen the asset base of the company:
You may purchase Coal Fields you now work or Coal Leases you hold, or buy out Wayleaves or Estates incorporated with your general properties or you may purchase shares in the interest of the Company or advance money on those shares by way of Mortgage -or buy first class debentures and thus create a money or capital fund from which you may borrow for extension or for dividends in bad years or for meeting exceptional losses in trade -or for distributing large outlay over an agreed number of years but always on the clear understanding that however invested the fund and its issuing revenue is a sacred dedication and which ... , if ever profanely touched, will fail to accomplish the purpose of the institution.
(ibid. p.107)
There are no Minutes recording the Directors' reaction to this report and the company did not adopt his suggested depreciation policy. Instead -and possibly because the North Eastern Railway Company and the Director common to both (John Fogg Elliott)
held more than 34% of Consett shares at incorporation (CH 1140 Annual Return 1865) -they continued with their previous form of replacement accounting copied from the railways and wrote off capital additions ("Special Expenditure") as an explicit appropriation of profit "below the line". This practice was followed until 1929. (Arnold (1997) ). In the early days of incorporations the owner-manager was the norm and disclosure of the depreciation policy was not necessary. As share ownership became more widespread companies in general disclosed less for a variety of possible reasons: fear of revealing important information to competitors; fear of provoking claims for higher wages from their workforce; fear of shareholders' demands for big dividends rather than prudent accounts -or a combination of these and others. There was also the temptation to omit making provision for depreciation in poor years to present the shareholders with higher profits and to be able to pay dividends and to keep this decision private:
Thus, accounting practices in the period appear to provide for maximum flexibility. Depreciation provisions may or may not be made; past provisions for depreciation may be restored to profit; and assets may be revalued to provide "profit" out of which dividends are made". (Brief, (1965) p.27) 
Transfer Pricing
A detailed report for Bolckow Vaughan (NRO B6 pp.460-5) considered the problem of distributing costs and revenues between the coal and iron divisions of the company's vertically integrated concern, which were then used to compare the profitability of these divisions. (Boyns and Edwards (1997, p.19 ) discuss a similar report from Armstrong on transfer pricing which was copied into the archives of Bell Brothers.) The comparison turned on the price charged when transferring coal and coke from the colliery to the iron works, which was:
... just one of those paradoxes of bookkeeping which fulfil the sneer which has frequently been launched on the professional treatment of accounts that there is nothing so fallacious as facts and figures.
He went on to correct the Bolckow Vaughan costing figures: The errors were many: small coal used in making coke charged at less than cost; production overheads allocated over only part of the output (and therefore at too high a rate), and, worst of all, for interdepartmental comparison:
The coke was debitted (sic) the Iron Works at an average 9/6d per ton whilst I am quite sure that the same coke could have been disposed of at 13/= per ton ... . And the same error pervades all the Collieries ... . The profit and Loss accounts of the Collieries and Mines prepared from these costs and receipts are I need not say wholly unreliable and fictitious. (ibid.)
The Directors had to decide whether they wished to compare profits of their internal divisions and what purpose this comparison might serve. Armstrong offered a choice of three policies, starting with the easiest of treating the company as a single ironproducing concern:
1. They (the coal and coke) may be transferred as integral parts of one whole concern all the processes from first to last being subordinated to and terminating in the production of 1 Ton of metal.
The Mines and Collieries may be worked with a view simply to supply the requirements of the Iron Works only or to furnish this supply with a surplus for sale to strangers.
If worked for sale as well as to supply the Iron Works then any profits realised on these sales go to the credit of costs and by just so much is the cost of making metal reduced.
Alternatively, internal transfers of coal could be made at cost price (2) or at market price (3). In the former case (2) the coal sold would be almost a by-product and the company effectively an integrated iron-works. Only the last treatment would make the two divisions of coal and iron fina ncially independent.
2. They may be transferred to the Iron Works upon some modification of this plan. Such of the minerals as the iron Works take to be debitted (sic) to them at their cost price and the Profit or Loss of the minerals sold to be dealt with as a separate account.
OR 3. They may be transferred to the iron Works as the produce of independent concerns as if in fact the Iron Works bought all their minerals ... as strangers paying for them the current price of the day.
In this view the I ron Works might take only such and reject such as they found most advantageous leaving the Collieries to find the best markets for their produce as was not wanted Under this treatment the Collieries would show their Profit or Loss without any other adventitious aid from the Iron Works. (emphases added)
The figures actually used by Bolckow Vaughan gave an entirely erroneous impression of the relative profitabilities of the enterprise:
It is abundantly clear that as you have dealt with these costs you know nothing what you are doing as matter of account between different branches of your manufacture. It may be and no doubt was the fact that if the Collieries had been independent in 1865 and 1866 and sold their produce to the highest bidder their profits would have been considerably higher -that many branches of your iron Works were carried on to a loss whilst apparently disclosing a profit -that the loss ... as realised ... would have shown a much more disasterous (sic) issue had the transactions been placed in its true position.
(emphases added)
The aggregate profits of the company would be unchanged whatever policy were chosen to value the coal and coke used in the iron foundries, but … if the true end of bookkeeping be to eliminate such branches as sacrifice money … and retain only those that are beneficial you deprive yourselves of the only true test and check you have in thus making things pleasant.
If the Directors wished to make a true comparison between the profitability and efficiency of the collieries and the iron works the establishment of an "arm's length" transfer price for all the coal and coke consumed within the business was imperative. This might be difficult to achieve in practice:
If you adopt the principle of buying all things at market value how do you ascertain ... the current value of the coal and coke which you wholly consume. Your Iron Works Manager will be everlastingly at war with your Colliery Manager, the one to depress the other to enhance unduly and between two stools we know the adage.
... Some principle must obviously be hit upon which shall be fair to the two departments and fair also to yourselves ... . As they now stand nothing can be more deceptive in showing the relative values of your properties. (ibid.)
A footnote in Boyns et al.'s 1999 paper confirms the difficulty:
The establishment of the market price to be used as the basis for the transfer price system must have been extremely difficult. Whilst there was always a spot market in coal, prices here could be extremely volatile. Furthermore parcels of coal sold on the spot market might be small due to the practice of colliery companies selling as much as 75% of their output on annual contract. Whilst the latter ensured that collieries could remain in regular production, the prices fixed by such contracts could rapidly get out of line with spot market prices when shortages or gluts occurred … .(emphasis in original) (ibid. p.92)
Valuation of Mines
Many of Armstrong's non-engineering Reports concerned the valuation of mines for prospective purchasers or at incorporation as a company. Two of these have already been an object for discussion and criticism in this journal (Baldwin and Berry, 1999 ) and one of these has therefore been chosen as the subject of the present section. It is a typical example. Armstrong did not use historic costs or replacement costs in any of his valuations.
His method was economic. He began with an estimate of the net cash-flow (misleadingly referred to as "profit", but explicitly excluding all non-cash deductions such as depreciation) for each pit, based on stated assumptions of the possible annual output, prices and costs and the duration of the leases held by the business. These estimated total annual "profits" were then valued as annuities, of the same duration as the leases held, at discount rates of 12% and 14%, a high discount rate -but in line with the returns expected from mines at that time (see, for example, Taylor (1980, p.59), Boyns and Edwards (1995, p.31) and Church, Baldwin and Berry (1994, p.716) ). The techniques employed in the valuation indicate his clear understanding of discounting and net present value as a basis for financial decisions as early as 1863 -a point already noted by Baldwin (1994, p.4) , and further discussed below.
Another economic concept he understood was opportunity cost. The valuation of the Staveley ironstone mines presented a problem in that i t might be possible to buy ironstone cheaper than producing it in house -in which case there would be "no interest in the lease of these mines and the Stock being immediately available has its present value in its Auction worth" -net realisable value, in fact. The Staveley Company was incorporated on 29 December 1863 and the assets purchased first recorded on the balance sheet of 30 June 1864. This Staveley valuation is cited as "a substantial undervaluation" (Baldwin and Berry, (1999) p. 87) and the similar Bolckow Vaughan valuation in 1863 as "notable for the doubt which it again raises as to the probity of the valuation" (ibid. p. 91). These valuations are criticized with the benefit of hindsight and in connection with both companies' revaluation of their assets (some ten years later) in the boom of 1870-73 when coal prices rose to a peak 6 which was never to be repeated in real terms (Mitchell and Deane, 1962 p. 482 ).
The Staveley and Bolckow Vaughan and all other such valuations were meticulously and explicitly calculated on the basis of the leases and prices as they were at the time Armstrong's prudence on coal prices should be compared with another contemporary practitioner of NPV valuation, William Craig of Cheshire, who was asked to value the Shelton Iron, Steel and Coal Company in 1889 for an uncontested merger (Edwards and Warman, (1981) ). He employed the same technique as Armstrong with one difference:
An important assumption on which Craig's projections were based was proven wrong by subsequent events. He expected the recent recovery in coal prices to continue whereas for six years during the 1890s the average price of coal was significantly below that ruling in 1889. (emphasis added) (p.46) This "optimistic assumption" led a substantial overvaluation of these collieries, criticized as early as 1891.
There are two further and important factors to be considered in the valuations: leases and stamp duty, which are discussed next.
Leases
All parties to the Staveley purchase would be aware of the real option to renew or extend the l eases. However, the "very profitable and effective renegotiation" of the leases after 1864 by Markham (Staveley's Director) was not a foregone conclusion (Church (1986 p.16) ); landowners were capricious and unpredictable. Half a century later, when coal production was needed for munitions and energy in the First World War, the question of nationalising underground minerals and surface rights was considered.
A Government report was published on "The acquisition for public purposes for rights and powers in connection with mines and minerals" listing fourteen factors which caused "loss to the nation of its mineral resources". These included (abridged and in summary):
• where the owner of minerals is reluctant to sell, lease or otherwise deal … "In some of these cases the owner is unreasonable".
• "where the owner … demands exorbitant terms for permission to work".
• where minerals lie under land which is copyhold (freehold delegated by the Lord of the Manor) and the other party refuses to join in a lease.
• where the owner of the surface has a legal right to support of the surface by the minerals underneath.
• where owners refuse to grant or demand unreasonable terms for wayleaves, either above or below ground.
• where restrictive covenants are imposed to protect the surface owner.
• where the "lay out" of a mineral field (being determined by the accidents of surface ownership) are from a technical mining point of view, unsatisfactory. (Cmd. 156, 1919 pp. 86-87) This may be dismissed as wartime anxiety or nationalising zeal, but the evidence in all Armstrong's reports fully confirms the reality of the problem. Every mining valuation began with a meticulous analysis of the leases: the area; duration; rentals; royalties payable; underground and surface rights for access (and timber and grazing and even shooting); restrictive covenants; permission to sub-lease; arrangements for surface damage; wayleaves; cancellation penalties and so on. The earliest Report signed by Armstrong (1857) ends:
We would in conclusion call your attention especially to the following Circumstances of Control by the Lessors and the disabilities and Special Covenants of the leases.
(NRO B20 p.493)
These were, in summary:
• another claimant to the coal currently being worked.
• restrictions on assignments and underletting which needed to be overruled.
• "very objectionable qualification to the power of surrender, the performance of every Covenant as a Condition precedent to the exercise of the power … " (ibid.).
As another supporting example, in 1875 Consett's directors required the valuation of a short term lease on Milkwell Burn Colliery which was for sale and strategically situated in relation to leases they already held. Armstrong fully appreciated the desirability of consolidating their holdings but urged caution in the assumption that their existing leases would be extended at or before expiry:
I have authority to state that under certain pending arrangements Lord Bute's coal is at present unavailable. His Lordship is disinclined to let any coal in Durham. … It is useless therefore to go into the resources and give a hypothetical value to properties which you cannot acquire or which have no present value in the very limited term of the Duke's lease viz. 15 years ... there is a speculative value no doubt in your being in possession and with means of working these other unlet properties by underground drifts only. Still there are too many instances on record where too much weight has been attached to this position and Coal fields have been let to unexpected and independent tenants. (NRO B8 p.577-9) Lord Bute's "disinclination" sounds capricious, and "unexpected and independent tenants" would be a difficulty in any large coal field. 
Stamp Duty
The other factor to be considered was the Stamp Duty payable on the transfer of assets such as land and buildings from the Barrow partnership (or any partnership) to the limited liability company. David Chadwick (Cottrell 1984, pp.59-64) 
Risk adjusted discount rates
The earliest instance of valuation of a coal mine by discounted cash flow in the form of an annuity found in the Armstrong Report books was dated February 13 1835 (NRO B20 pp.1-12). This used 10% as discount rate without comment but a later report (December 30 1837 These nominal discount rates are less than the real rates: the period 1855-1900 was one of deflation. (Mitchell and Deane, 1962, p.343) One exception to these general rates was seen: a discount rate of 20% for a property Armstrong viewed as very risky. He was asked by David Chadwick to value the Cyfarthfa Iron Works belonging to R. Crawshay in 1873. He found fault with the offer for sale:
It has become a fashionable formula when computing the mining resources of any Iron Establishment in Wales to set out every seam whether large or small -useful or uselessprofitable or incapable of being brought to profit -add up the entire section of all and then advertise the property as containing thousands of acres with an unlimited aggregate of Coal seams … (NRO B8 pp. and he thought the equipment was likewise overvalued: "it is perfectly clear that the entire plant is about used up … and … should be pulled down and rebuilt." He calculated the "more reliable resources" of coal, estimated the outlay required on a new winning to keep out water as £60,000 and looked at the mineral stock and was not impressed:
I can discover no such value as £250,000 in the Stocks and Stores -There is no Coal nor Coke in Stock and but little Metal or Bars -little over the regular trading stock -There is lots of Haematite and lots of rubbish and lots which have been left in heaps as less economical to work up. All the Colliery Plant, loose tools, horses, engines and loose stock … cannot have any present value … (ibid. p.227-8).
He estimated that it would take two years to re-equip the colliery and therefore:
I have allowed a purchaser 20% as the best sale seams are under level and are not won, and to meet the contingencies of an antiquated plant and to cover the rebate of the two years' profits. 
Summary
Armstrong and his sons and partners regularly applied the technique of discounting expected cash flows at risk adjusted rates of return to the valuation of coal mines before any book was published on the subject (Parker, (1968) ). Miller and Napier (1993) 7 I am grateful to the curator of the Welsh National Museum in Cardiff for this information, taken from Mine Inspectors' Reports.
distinguish the adoption of the NPV technique by accountants with its evolution in other fields:
For the technology of discounting is not an invention of the twentieth century. … By the late seventeenth century standard annuity tables were starting to come into existence. Moreover developments in engineering in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries articulated usages of discounting and net present value concepts. … Discounting techniques did not originate within accounting.
The introduction of discounting techniques into accounting was one of the key innovations of the post-war years (post 1945) that helped to construct management accounting out of cost accounting.
(pages 640-1)
The "pioneering work on the net present value rule" is credited to Irwing Fisher's book In economics it is difficult to prove originality; for the germ of every new idea will surely be found over and over again in earlier writers. For myself, I would be satisfied to have my conclusions accepted as true even if their origin should be credited by the critics wholly to earlier writers.
(p. ix)
Armstrong used the NPV rule in making financial decisions on the purchase or valuation of coal mines and had put this into practice at least fifty years before Fisher's book was published. His many clients followed his advice on purchasing decisions and included his valuations on their balance sheets. He was not the first or the only nineteenth century practitioner. The question arises why NPV was forgotten by British accountants and had to be reintroduced in the 1960s. It is generally assumed that financial management is a "march of progress" and continuous improvement but the loss of the NPV technique is consistent with Arnold's (1995) The reports written for the North Eastern Railway and the Australian Agricultural Company were all concerned with civil and structural engineering relating to mines and surface land; the reports on collieries were a mixture of mining engineering, colliery valuation and management accounting.
Reports were also written relating to mines and enterprises in Cheshire, Cumberland, Gloucestershire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Aberdeenshire, Shropshire, Somerset, Staffordshire, Ulster, Brecon, Warwickshire and Worcestershire.
A number of the valuations were commissioned by regular clients, for example Eston Iron Mines in Yorkshire for Bolckow Vaughan, South Tanfield Mine in County Durham for James Joicey (owner of many Durham coalfields)
